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BOOk REViEWS
De Roo, Neal. Futurity in Phenomenology: Promise and Method in Husserl, Levinas, and Derrida. Fordham 
University Press, 2013. xvii + 212 pp. iSBN: 978-0-8232-4464-5. Reviewed by Aron Reppmann, Professor 
of Philosophy and Director of New Faculty Formation, Trinity Christian College, Palos Heights, illinois.
The phenomenological approach in philosophy, which 
originated with the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938), is characterized by its resistance toward any 
attempt at reducing the complexity of human expe-
rience in the world—philosophical reductions that 
stress either human subjectivity or the objectivity 
of the world as the ultimate root of our experience. 
Phenomonology’s commitment to honoring the ir-
reducible complexity of experience is already evident 
in what is often considered to be its basic structural 
insight, namely the “intentionality of consciousness.” 
Intentionality is the idea that consciousness is always 
consciousness-of something, and, conversely, that any-
thing is only experienced or encountered in its mani-
festation for-consciousness. Doing justice to the reality 
of experience, according to phenomenology, means 
not imposing a linear logic on it, but rather remaining 
attentive to the constitutive, ongoing interplay that is 
always at work within it.
In this book, Neal De Roo traces another instance 
of phenomenology’s predilection for complex relations 
and inherent tensions, namely the significance of futu-
rity, the way in which our experience of time is both 
anticipatory and undetermined because it is inher-
ently open to the future, to what is to come. Although 
phenomenologists, beginning with Husserl himself, 
have offered analyses of time-consciousness (the inter-
relation of past, present, and future in our experience 
of time) as integral to consciousness as such, De Roo 
contends that “the true centrality of the future to the 
project of phenomenology has not yet been elaborat-
ed” (1). He argues, in fact, that intentionality and fu-
turity are intrinsically linked: “The phenomenological 
claim of intentionality—that the constituting subject 
must be necessarily ‘open’ beyond itself and its own 
horizons—emerges only when futurity is considered 
essential to phenomenology” (3). The promise of this 
book is that it will treat a selection of authors and texts 
that are well-known to those familiar with phenom-
enology, but from a standpoint whose importance has 
previously been neglected. In doing so, De Roo hopes 
to unify the phenomenological project—to heal some 
of its internal dissensions—but not, of course, to sim-
ply resolve them, since a drive toward simple resolu-
tion would contradict phenomenology’s commitment 
to honoring inherent complexities.
De Roo’s expressed intention in this book is to be 
neither an historian nor a practitioner of phenomenol-
ogy, but a sort of mechanic of phenomenology (this is 
my image, not his). He focuses on the structural com-
mitments of phenomenological method and uses those 
structural insights to diagnose particular problems and 
to suggest possible repairs. He contends that attend-
ing to the different ways in which futurity functions in 
phenomenology will “show us something important 
about phenomenology and its operation” (6) and of-
fers the promise of “build[ing] a bridge over the chasm 
that has developed between Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy, on the one hand, and ‘theological’ phenomenol-
ogy on the other” (2).
Even as he focuses structurally rather than histori-
cally, De Roo is a master storyteller. His treatments 
of the three philosophers on which the book focus-
es—Husserl, Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), and 
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)—are staged as an un-
folding conceptual narrative, such that the possibili-
ties and problems in Husserl’s analyses of futurity lead 
directly to Levinas, and the possibilities and problems 
in Levinas’ analyses of futurity in turn lead directly to 
Derrida. 
Part I, “Futurity in the constitution of transcen-
dental subjectivity,” offers a sustained encounter with 
Husserl, exploring three different modes of futurity in 
Husserl’s work—protention, expectation, and antici-
pation. These three modes correspond to three differ-
ent levels of consciousness, ranging from the “abso-
lute” and universal operation of consciousness-as-such 
to the particularities of an individual’s consciousness. 
Throughout Part I, De Roo demonstrates his impres-
sive ability as a mechanic of phenomenology. In chap-
ter 1 he reaches beyond the limitations of Husserl’s 
classic book on time-consciousness (The Internal 
Consciousness of Time), in which futurity is given short 
shrift as merely a kind of inverse of retention, to lesser-
known, later writings that recognize a more distinctive 
and truly futural role for protention. In chapter 2 he 
34     Pro Rege—March 2015
painstakingly establishes the three-level approach to 
organizing Husserl’s understanding of futurity, which 
Husserl does not explicitly present as such but which, 
as De Roo demonstrates, makes good and clarifying 
sense of Husserl’s various writings on this subject. 
In chapter 3, De Roo “[goes] beyond the letter of 
Husserl’s texts” to round out the portrait of futurity’s 
role in time-consciousness with an account of what we 
as particular subjects do in the “active directing of the 
egoic regard,” which he calls “anticipation” (6). 
For all his fine-grained analysis and appreciation 
of Husserl’s treatments of futurity, De Roo ultimately 
finds those treatments limited by Husserl’s tendency to 
treat time-consciousness primarily as an epistemologi-
cal concern. Anticipating the ways in which Levinas 
and Derrida will re-found phenomenology in ethical 
and religious attunement, De Roo in chapter 3 be-
gins to turn the analysis in that direction, particularly 
through his examination of an essay on hope by James 
K.A. Smith and through the anticipatory structure of 
making and accepting promises. This sets the stage for 
Part II, “Futurity and the ‘openness’ of the intentional 
subject,” where the focus is on Levinas. 
Where Part I introduced the inherent tension 
involved in a phenomenological account of futurity, 
Part II explores that tension by asking how this ac-
count affects the nature of subjectivity itself. Husserl 
emphasizes the way in which consciousness constitutes 
the world, while Levinas emphasizes the way in which 
consciousness is receptive of the world. Levinas’ strik-
ingly different approach “posit[s] ethics, not ontology 
or epistemology, as first philosophy.” De Roo argues 
that Levinas’ different starting-point “does not go be-
yond phenomenology so much as it moves within a 
broadly Husserlian phenomenology against a concep-
tion of phenomenology that would unduly narrow its 
scope” (7). 
In Part II, De Roo traces Levinas’ critical appro-
priation of Husserl, demonstrating in chapter 5 that 
Levinas’ vision of the self as constituted by the other 
gives a special role both to the irretrievable past (what 
overcame me before I could ever take initiative) and 
to the future (which is inherently open and surpris-
ing, out of my control or ability to reliably predict). 
De Roo concludes that “[s]ubjectivity itself, then, is 
futural for Levinas” in a far more profound and inher-
ently destabilizing way than it was for Husserl (85). 
But then in chapter 6, De Roo anticipates his later 
focus on Derrida by introducing the Derridean idea 
of “promise” as a concretization of futurity in respon-
sibility for other people. With this, he indicates that 
Levinas’ own account of futurity does not turn explic-
itly in this direction. 
This key turning-point in the book is likely to be a 
point of contention between partisans of Levinas and 
those of Derrida. Those whose sympathies lie more 
with Derrida are likely to contend (as De Roo does) 
that Levinas has missed something that must not be 
avoided, while those whose sympathies lie more with 
Levinas are likely to wonder (as I do) whether his 
thinking is being subjected to a conception of “eth-
ics” that misconstrues the significance of his work. 
This way of “saving” Levinas’ insights may be viewed 
as something more of a betrayal (94-95).
Part III, “Futurity and intentionality—the prom-
ise of relationship,” further explores a phenomenologi-
cal account of futurity in its focus on Derrida. Derrida 
serves De Roo well for this exploration. A consistent 
motif here is the articulation of multiple inherent-
tension dualities, and “double necessity” is one of De 
Roo’s favorite conceptual devices—sometimes even 
multiple, mutually entailing double necessities, as 
when he outlines a “pair of essential dualities” (132). 
Chapter 7 shows how, like Levinas, Derrida finds an 
inherent tension built into the structure of phenom-
enology. But this tension—indicated by the Derridean 
term différance (“differing” as an always-ongoing, rest-
lessly oscillating process of “deferring”)—does not 
decide for either Husserl’s or Levinas’ version of phe-
nomenological futurity. Instead, it holds onto both of 
them in “a ‘unity’ that preserves the difference of each 
pole in tension with each other” (8). 
Here the idea of “promise” comes back in full 
force as the “central aspect” of Derrida’s understanding 
of futurity, which is named “the messianic.” As with 
Levinas, futurity or openness is not something subse-
quent to the subject but is what has constituted the 
subject itself. For Derrida “this promise is not made to 
us, but is us: We are promised by the other, and it is 
our responsibility . . . to respond to a call or promise 
that, in a certain sense, was made before we were on 
the scene” (127). De Roo argues that, for Derrida, the 
promise “is the very structure of the future” (128). 
In chapter 9, the final expository portion of the 
book, De Roo secures the centrality of the theme of 
futurity for the phenomenological enterprise by in-
dicating some important limits to or restrictions on 
what he has offered in the preceding couple of chap-
ters. Here his account of the promise seems somewhat 
more Levinasian in tone, in the sense of emphasizing 
that the “ethics” on offer here is not oriented to the 
particular concerns with applying principles for good 
action (a commonplace conception of ethics), but 
rather is a highlighting of the “anticipatory aspect” to 
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every subjective act (139).
De Roo’s concluding chapter, “The promissory 
discipline,” takes final stock of what he has achieved 
in the book. He carefully and convincingly points out 
the ways in which his identification and amplifica-
tion of futurity as central to phenomenology “opens 
phenomenology to a set of problems and questions 
that otherwise might seem to fall outside its scope.” 
In terms of my earlier description, De Roo’s insight-
ful care as a “mechanic” of phenomenology especially 
shines in this concluding account. These final pages 
open the exciting prospect of broad cultural relevance 
for the work he has offered. 
De Roo suggests that his interpretation of phe-
nomenology as essentially promissory can open up 
“the claims of the various sciences” to see the ways in 
which they are “united together in the lives of indi-
vidual people, who live in and as the promise of their 
respective traditions,” as well as the ways in which 
“communities and institutions, and not just individu-
als, are called to live in, as, and up to the promise” 
(152). His closing assertion that “the phenomenologi-
cal project is not only communal and intersubjective 
in its method…but also in its application and scope” 
makes this reader eager for the sequel in which these 
tantalizing suggestions could be developed more fully 
(152). I would expect, given the prominence in these 
closing remarks of references to “community” and 
“tradition,” that this subsequent work would offer a 
more sustained dialogue with the hermeneutical wing 
of phenomenology represented by Martin Heidegger 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer, whom De Roo mentions 
occasionally but did not have the space to treat at 
length.
Most readers of Pro Rege are likely to note with 
interest that Neal De Roo is a current faculty member 
at Dordt College. Readers of De Roo’s book who are 
familiar with the Reformational Christian philosophi-
cal tradition, which has exercised a profound shaping 
effect on Dordt’s history, may want to keep that tradi-
tion in mind as they read his account of phenomenol-
ogy’s commitment to honoring the complexities and 
inherent tensions of human experience. Reformational 
philosophy, which was initiated by Dirk Vollenhoven 
and Herman Dooyeweerd at roughly the same time as 
Husserl was establishing phenomenology, is similarly 
committed to an anti-reductionist approach to com-
plexity. While De Roo does not explicitly address the 
Reformational tradition, he does provide ample ma-
terial for readers interested in considering the affinity 
between this tradition and phenomonology.
This is not a book for beginners, at least not be-
ginners reading on their own. Phenomenology is 
intricate in its conceptuality, its terminology, and its 
controversies, and De Roo dives right in to the midst 
of it, assuming his readers’ expertise and offering few 
handholds for those who do not already possess that 
expertise. That said, his voice is lively throughout, and 
his cheerful good humor winks out persistently. In the 
hands of a skilled teacher, this book would serve very 
well as a thematic centering text for a graduate or up-
per-level undergraduate seminar on phenomenology. 
The tight structure of the book’s contents, along with 
its abundant endnotes (37 pages of small type), gen-
erous bibliography (13 pages), and carefully prepared 
index, would provide ample resources for students and 
professor to navigate both through and beyond the 
text. If Neal De Roo himself were to offer such a course 
as a seminar for colleagues in the discipline—such as 
a National Endowment for the Humanities summer 
seminar—I would be the first in line to sign up.
klay, Phil. Redeployment. New York: Penguin, 2014. 304 pages, paperback. iSBN: 978-1-5942-0499-5. 
Reviewed by James C. Schaap, Emeritus Professor of English, Dordt College, Sioux Center, iA.
 War stories usually take on the motif of initiation 
because no one, thank goodness, is ever prepared for 
watching friends—buddies—die and die fitfully; war 
stories are always about men and women whose lives 
and visions are changed by warfare, changed forever. 
Experiencing the horror of war leaves those who 
are changed with memories as sharp as cut glass, 
stories you either tell or you do not. Many do not, 
but not talking about one’s experiences often means 
those stories create a din within the echo chamber 
that one’s mind and heart becomes. PTSD can re-
sult—at least that’s the common wisdom.
The stories Phil Klay tells in Redeployment, a riv-
eting collection of tales dug out of the recent Iraq 
War are not so much about not telling war stories. 
They’re not about what veterans suffer for their si-
lence. What Klay does so poignantly is explore the 
heartache one feels in telling them.
All vets, I suppose, are achingly conscious of the 
stories they have and can tell because they discov-
er that some people really do want to know them, 
for reasons that are both noble and ignoble, for 
everything from soulful empathy to sick entertain-
ment.  Many do want to know.
